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identify the causal effect of child care costs on fertility in a context in which child care 
enrolment is almost universal and the labor force participation of mothers is very high. 
A typical household planning another child experienced a reduction in expected future 
child care costs of SEK 106,000 (USD 17,800). This reduction resulted in 3–5 more 
child births per 1,000 women during an 18 month period, which corresponds to a 4–6 
per cent increase in the birth rate. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Low fertility rates, aging populations, and the concern for long run labor supply have 
inspired policy interest in how the availability and price of child care services influence 
maternal labor supply and birth rates. Cross country comparisons show that birth rates 
are indeed higher in OECD countries with high female labor force participation and 
wide access to child care (D'Addio and Mira d'Ercole, 2005). Yet, the direction of 
causality is not well understood.  
We aim to establish if there is a causal effect of child care costs on fertility. To 
this end, we exploit the quasi-experiment created by the Swedish Child Care Reform in 
2001. This reform imposed a cap on child care charges and standardized fee schedules 
across Swedish municipalities. As a consequence of the reform, households, similar in 
characteristics, experienced different cost changes depending on where they lived, and 
households in a given municipality experienced different cost changes depending on 
characteristics such as household income, and the number and age of the children. 
Hence, depending on the household characteristics that determine child care charges, 
the reform introduced exogenous variation in child care costs.  
Our estimates imply that the reform, which induced an average reduction in total 
child care costs of SEK 106,000 (just over 50 per cent), increased fertility rates by about 
4–6 per cent. Stated differently, a USD 10,000 reduction in child care costs increased 
fertility by 2–3 children per 1,000 women. 
Theoretical models of fertility and maternal labor supply (e.g. Ermish, 1989a, b; 
Apps and Rees, 2004) predict that reductions in child care costs ought to affect labor 
supply, rather than fertility, when child care enrollment and labor supply are initially 
low. The reason for this is that cost reductions make it more attractive to enter the labor 
market or to work longer hours. Yet, in the Swedish context, in which labor supply and 
child care enrollment are high but fertility is relatively low, fertility may be the more 
likely margin of adjustment to cost changes. A reason is that Swedish child care is 
supplied during regular and rather short work hours, leaving little scope for increasing 
labor supply on the intensive margin. Indeed, Lundin et al. (2008) find that the 
reduction in child care charges after the reform had no effect on the labor supply of 
Swedish mothers. There is also evidence that hours in care for children already enrolled 
increased only marginally as a result of lower child care costs (Wikstrom, 1997). 
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Previous microstudies have found mixed support for the hypothesis that lower 
child care charges increase fertility. Blau and Robins (1989) use American survey data 
and find that a higher cost for child care had a negative impact on the birth rates of 
women who were not employed, but no effect on employed women. In a study of Italian 
data, Del Boca (2002) finds that both fertility and labor force participation are positively 
correlated with better access to child care. These studies, however, suffer from 
endogeneity problems. Both the availability of child care and the charges actually paid 
by families are largely a matter of choice on the part of local governments in response to 
demand, or families making choices over both quality and quantity of child care.  
In a more recent study, Schlosser (2006) uses the introduction of free public 
preschool for children aged 3 and 4 in Israel to estimate the effects of a reduction in 
child care costs on Arab mothers' labor supply and fertility. She finds no effect on 
fertility but a positive impact on labor supply. Schlosser uses quasi-experimental data 
and is therefore more likely to capture causal effects rather than correlations. However, 
the context she studies is specific in the sense that maternal labor supply was initially 
very low, while fertility was high and no subsidized child care existed prior to the 
reform. In such a situation we would hardly expect to see further increases in fertility. 
Two recent studies on US data use changes in household service sector wages, 
caused by low wage immigration, to study the effects on labor supply and fertility. 
Cortes and Tessada (2008) find positive effects on the labor supply of women, and, in 
particular, that well educated mothers worked longer hours when low skilled 
immigration increased the supply of cheap and flexible child care. Furtado and Hock 
(2008) show that lower wages in the child care sector resulted in higher fertility for 
these well educated women. 
The US context is more similar to the Swedish context studied here; most women 
work, have children and use child care. However, there are important differences. 
Immigration may primarily lower the price of flexible nanny services making it possible 
to combine career and family for high earning women, but this kind of child care may 
still be out of reach for women with less education and lower earnings. The present 
study, instead examines changes in costs for already highly subsidized child care during 
regular work hours. We should hence expect to see effects for a different group of 
women. Our results also show that it is primarily households where the women work 
part-time that respond to the changes in child care charges. Women working fulltime do 
not respond.  
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An important advantage in analyzing the Swedish setting is that most Swedish 
households with young children use some form of subsidized child care. In 2004, 90 
percent of all children aged 3–6 attended publicly subsidized child care. The choice of 
whether to use subsidized child care or not is thus less of an issue than in many other 
child care markets. As a consequence, we can study the effect of cost changes on the 
entire population of households, as opposed to only on a small part of the population, 
which is a common weakness of studies using quasi-experiments. This significantly 
strengthens the external validity of our results (see discussion in Moffitt, 2005; and 
Angrist et al., 2008). Furthermore, because the child care reform studied in this paper 
affected most families, it is possible to study heterogeneous responses to changes in 
child care cost.  
The effects of child care cost changes are not the same for all women. As 
mentioned above we find larger effects of child care cost changes on the fertility 
decisions of women working part-time. We also find that younger women (34 or 
younger) are more likely to respond. We further find that the effects of reduced child 
care charges are particularly strong for households with no earlier children and for third 
births. Since there is a clear two-child norm in Sweden, the fact that the effect is largest 
for third births suggests that the reform has affected completed fertility rates. Thus, our 
findings are not only a matter of reduced spacing between children.  
Before presenting the data, discussing our identification strategy in some detail 
and arriving at estimation results, we will next provide a background on Swedish 
fertility, the child care market and the design of the child care reform of 2001.  
 
2 Institutional background 
 
2.1 Child care in Sweden 
 
Sweden has a long tradition of publicly subsidized child care for pre-school children, 
and after-school care for young school children. Until the early 1990s, child care was 
publicly provided, but since then, a growing proportion of municipalities have 
introduced voucher systems, paving the way for private provision of services.  
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Figure 1 shows the proportions of children attending some form of publicly 
subsidized child care over time, by age. The enrolment rates have increased 
dramatically over time, and in 2004 as many as 90 percent of all children aged 3–6 
attended child care.1 The enrolment rate is also high for very young children (aged 1–2). 
One explanation for these high enrolment rates is that the local governments in Sweden 
are obliged by law to provide child care for children aged 1–12 whose parents either 
work or are full-time students, within three to four months from the parents' request.2 
Subsidies for child care for infants are, however, restricted to families and children with 
special needs, and hence enrolment for infants is negligible.3 
 
Figure 1 The proportion of children enrolled in subsidized child care by age, 1976–2004 
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 Source: National Board of Education (Skolverket) 
 
Until 2002, the municipalities were free to set their own child care charges, as long as 
these were "reasonable". According to Government Bill 93/94:11, "child care charges 
must not be so high that parents, for economic reasons, refrain from letting their child 
attend a child care activity that the child would benefit from". This definition clearly 
                                                 
1 Publicly subsidized child care comes in different forms, the most common being center-based care. 
Different forms of family day care, in a publicly-paid carer’s home or in the child’s home also exist. 
Although financing of child care is public, care providers can be public, cooperative or private. 
2 There are 290 local governments in Sweden. In addition to child care, they are responsible for primary 
and secondary education, care of the elderly and disabled, welfare and local infrastructure. Local 
governments finance their activities by, in order of their importance, a proportional local income tax, 
grants from the central government, and user fees.  
3 Infants are instead cared for by their mothers and to a much smaller extent by their fathers. Parents are 
entitled to a year’s paid parental leave with an income replacement rate of 80 per cent up to a cap. 
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gives room for different interpretations, and consequently child care fee schedules 
differed considerably between municipalities, both with respect to levels and 
construction. In particular, charges varied with family income and age and number of 
children. Some municipalities applied a flat charge per child, but most municipalities 
used elaborate fee schedules which implied that families with high incomes and few 
young children paid the highest charges per child. Child care was, however, heavily 
subsidized in all municipalities, and only about 15–20 percent of the municipalities’ 
child care costs were covered by user charges. 
 
2.2 The child care reform 
 
In the last months of the election campaign in the 1998 elections, the incumbent Social 
Democratic Party proposed a large child care reform designed to reduce user fees and 
further increase accessibility of child care.4 Although the Social Democrats won the 
election, the reform bill was not passed by the Swedish Parliament until three years into 
the election term, in November 2000. The government justified the reform in terms of a 
wish to i) give all children equal access to educational activities ii) improve economic 
conditions for families with children, and iii) facilitate parental labor force participation. 
The reform was implemented gradually and consisted of several parts. The most 
important component was an option for the municipalities, as of 2002, to impose a cap 
stipulated by central government on user fees for child care. Municipalities that chose to 
do so were granted compensation (at least partially) for lost revenues. As it turned out, 
all but two municipalities implemented the capped fee schedule in January 2002. The 
remaining two municipalities implemented the reform in the following year. Most 
municipalities took the decision to implement the capped fee schedule as late as in the 
fall of 2001. Hence, it was not until then that families knew whether they would benefit 
from lower child care costs or not. We return to this issue when defining our pre- and 
post-reform periods.  
The capped fee schedule, which has been in place since the reform, has two 
components. First, the charge per child is determined as a fixed percentage of household 
income. This percentage rate varies with the age and order of the child in the household, 
                                                 
4 Elinder, et al. (2008) analyze the reform’s impact on voter behavior and find that families with young 
children were affected by the promise. 
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so that the younger the child, the higher the rate, but the more younger siblings the child 
has that are also enrolled in public child care, the lower the rate.5 Secondly, fees are 
capped so that municipalities can only charge parents the fixed percentage of household 
income up to a monthly income ceiling which was SEK 38,000 (6,430 USD) in 2002. 
Per-child charges are constant for household income above this level. 
Prior to the reform there was substantial variation in child care fees across 
household types and municipalities. After the reform, comparable households faced 
similar child care charges regardless of where they lived. Moreover, child care became 
much cheaper as a result of the reform. In 1999, the median middle-income family with 
two adults and two pre-school aged children paid SEK 2,660 (380 USD) per month, and 
child care charges varied between SEK 1,560 (260 USD) and SEK 3,940 (670 USD) 
depending on where the family lived (Skolverket, 1999). In 2002, after the 
implementation of the reform, a similar family paid SEK 1,900 (320 USD) for the care 
of their two children where charges varied between SEK 1,040 (175 USD) and SEK 
1,900 (320 USD) (Skolverket, 2003). 
 
2.3 Fertility in Sweden 
 
In contrast to most OECD countries, where completed fertility rates have fallen 
considerable over the past few decades, completed fertility in Sweden has remained 
rather stable (see Björklund, 2006). The cohorts of women born 1926–59 had completed 
fertility rates around 2.0, with the highest rate (2.11) for the cohort born in 1943 and 
lowest rate (1.96) for the cohort born in 1945.  
Total fertility rates6 of Swedish women have, however, varied substantially over 
time, and so has the spacing between children. As is the case in other OECD countries, 
first-time mothers are getting older. Figure 2 shows the average number of children 
born per woman aged 20–45 in Sweden over the period 1968–2006. The Figure 
demonstrates substantial time variation in total fertility rates, with a recession in the late 
                                                 
5 The percentage rate for the first child in preschool is 3 percent, 2 percent for the second child, and 1 
percent for the third child. The corresponding figures for after school care are 2, 1 and 1 percent. The 
household does not pay anything for child number four and after. The youngest child is defined as child 
number 1. Hence families with one child in preschool and one in after school care pay 4 percent of 
household income. 
6 Total fertility in a given year shows how many children a hypothetical woman would have in her 
lifetime if she had as many children at each age as women of a given age in that particular year. 
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1970s and early 1980s, followed by a boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and lower 
levels again in the late 1990s. Total fertility rates have, however, picked up in recent 
years, from an all time low of 1.5 in 1999. 
 
Figure 2 The average number of children born per woman aged 20–45 in Sweden during the 
period 1968–2006. 
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                  Source: Statistics Sweden 
 
The fluctuations in total fertility largely mirror the development of the labor market 
with a few years lag, suggesting a link between the two. The correlation between total 
fertility and labor market opportunities is likely to depend on the design of the Swedish 
parental benefit system. For example, only parents who have been employed prior to 
pregnancy and birth qualify for income-related benefits up to a relatively high ceiling. 
The qualifying rules provide a strong incentive for women to postpone having children 
until they are established in the labor market (Björklund, 2006).7 
Interestingly, these aggregate numbers show a slight increase in the number of 
children born after the Swedish child care reform. But, given the magnitude of the 
cyclical fluctuations in fertility, we cannot readily interpret this increase as a causal 
effect of decreased child care costs due to the reform. In order to establish a causal link, 
we need to show that the changes in fertility behavior across different types of 
                                                 
7 See Adsera (2004, 2005) for discussions of the link between unemployment and fertility in explaining 
cross-country differences in fertility. 
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households are, in fact, related to how these household types were affected by the 
reform. In the next section, we discuss the empirical methodology in detail and present 
the data used to establish this link. 
 
3 Methodology and data 
 
3.1 Econometric challenge 
 
The problem arising when estimating the effect of child care costs on fertility is that 
observed child care costs for a given household are typically determined by household 
characteristics that are also likely to directly influence fertility decisions. If the Swedish 
child care reform had implied that changes in child care charges were truly random, and 
thereby independent of household characteristics, it would be straightforward to 
estimate the effect of the cost changes on fertility. However, this was not the case. In 
particular, the fee cap implied that high-income households experienced larger cost 
reductions than low-income households. In order to get unbiased estimates of the causal 
effect of child care costs on fertility we therefore need to hold constant all household 
characteristics that determine both child care charges and fertility decisions, and thus 
only identify the effect of child care costs through  the exogenous change in child care 
charges. 
The child care fee survey conducted by IFAU (for details, see Section 3.2) shows 
that the fee schedules, both before and after the reform, are fully determined by a subset 
of observable household characteristics. We denote this subset by Z.8 We can thereafter 
define a household type j as all households sharing the same characteristics Zj so that in 
a given municipality m at a given period in time, t, all households of type j have 
identical child care costs. In other words, for households of type j, the household's child 
care costs are a function Pmt(Zj). It follows that, any variation in child care costs within 
household type j in a given municipality is a result of exogenous changes in the fee 
schedule P over time. All possible direct effects of Zj on fertility can be accounted for 
                                                 
8 The variables that determine child care charges are household income, the number of children and the 
age of each child. These are all available in Swedish register data, and it is therefore possible to compute 
each household's exact child care fee both before and after the reform, on the assumption that all children 
of child-care eligible age are enrolled in full-time child care. We will return to this issue in Section 3.4. 
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by including fixed effects for each municipality-household type Zjm. More formally, we 
estimate the following relationship: 
 
Childijmt=α+βPjmt(Zj)+Zjm+τt+εijmt,  (1) 
 
where Childijmt is the probability that the woman in household i of type j, in 
municipality m, in period t, bears a child, and τt is a time-fixed effect, controlling for a 
common time trend in fertility.9 Including controls for household characteristics that 
influence fertility, but do not influence child care costs (e.g. maternal age and 
education) is not necessary for unbiased estimates of β , conditional on an assumption of 
homogenous responses to the price change. Including such controls may, however, 
increase efficiency. See discussion in Smith and Todd (2005). 
Our estimation strategy is to compare the probability that the woman in a 
household of a particular type in a particular municipality bears a child during a time 
window of a given length prior to the reform with the probability that a household of 
that same type in the same municipality has a child in a time window of the same length 
after the reform. The changes in fertility behavior are then related to the changes in 
child care costs induced by the reform for the same household type across different 
municipalities, and other types of households in the same municipality. This strategy 
produces a difference-in-differences estimator, where households are matched at the 
household type×municipality level. The resulting estimate of β, is the weighted-sum 
over all household types of the difference-in-differences estimates of fertility changes 
across municipalities and time within a given household type, where the weights are 
determined by the number of households grouped together in each household type j.  
One issue of concern is whether the effects of the child care reform can be isolated 
from the effects of other general or local reforms that took place at the same time? To 
the extent that such other reforms affected the same household types that were 
particularly affected by the child care reform, we must take this into account, otherwise 
our estimations will be biased. There were indeed other nationwide reforms in family 
policy during this time period. For example, an additional allowance for large families 
was introduced, and there were a number of changes made to tax-rules that are likely to 
                                                 
9 The same strategy is applied by Lundin et al. (2008) when investigating the effect of child care prices on 
parental labor supply. 
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have had differential effects on families in different income brackets. However, since 
there was no variation across municipalities in the implementation of these other reform 
packages, it is possible to account for the effect of such reforms by allowing for 
nationwide fertility trends for each household type.   
It is also possible that municipalities that implemented the largest fee cuts also 
introduced other child-related policies at the same time. In that case, changes in child 
care fees could pick up fertility effects that were not the result of the fee changes per se, 
but rather the effects of other policy changes. On the assumption that such local policies 
affected all the families in a municipality in the same way, we can control for this 
possibility by estimating the model with municipality-specific time trends in fertility.  
Allowing for both household type-specific time trends and municipality-specific time 
trends, equation (1) is modified  
 
Childijmt=α+βPjmt(Zj)+Zjm+τt+trendj+ trendm+εijmt.  (2) 
 
Due to computational restrictions, we estimate both equation (1) and (2) in first 
differences, i.e. netting out the fixed effects.10 This results in some loss of efficiency in 
comparison to the within-estimator. 
Another issue of concern is whether the child care reform also had effects on the 
quality of the care provided and/or that access to care was affected as a result of 
increased demand. Such effects could, potentially, confound the effects on fertility of a 
reduction in fees. As regards provision of care services, the reform is not likely to have 
had any major impact on the access to child care, since municipalities were obliged by 
law to provide a child with child care within 3 months of parental demand as early as 
1993. This obligation did not change. The reform, however, implied guaranteed access 
to child care for a minimum of 15 hours per week for the children of unemployed 
persons and parents on parental leave with younger siblings. These are the reason for 
the increase in enrolment seen in Figure 1, above. However, the number of enrolled 
children per child care employee, as well as the share of child care employees with 
training in pedagogics, remained constant between 2001 and 2003. Furthermore, if 
                                                 
10 Thus, when estimating eq. (1) we estimate: ∆Childjm=Childjmt-Childjmt-1 = α + β(Pmt (Zj) - (Pmt-1 (Zj)) 
+εjm, and when estimating eq. (2) we estimate: ∆Childjm== α + β(Pmt (Zj) - (Pmt-1 (Zj))+Zj+mm +εjm. 
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anything, the total cost per enrolled child increased slightly between 2001 and 2003.11 
There is hence no evidence that the reform implied lower child care quality. 
Our identification strategy assumes that the cost changes for each household-
municipality type are exogenous and do not depend on any other characteristics 
affecting fertility decisions and fees. One concern may be that families that are 
insensitive to the cost of child care are more likely to reside in municipalities with high 
fees. In this case, households receiving the largest reductions will be the least 
responsive to changes in child care costs. This selection problem might lead us to 
underestimate the impact of the reform on fertility, and bias our results against finding 
any effects. 
 
3.2 Data 
 
We use data from two sources. Firstly, the information on fee schedules comes from 
survey data on municipal child care charge tariffs conducted by IFAU.12 Secondly, 
information on household characteristics and fertility comes from register data from 
Statistics Sweden. All variable definitions can be found in Appendix Table A.2. 
Our sample consists of all couples in which the woman was 20–45 years old in the 
period 1997–2002. Since Swedish register data does not code cohabiting couples 
without common children as household units, we exclude from the analysis unmarried 
women without children, single mothers, and cohabiting unmarried mothers whose 
partner was not the father of her children. The reason for doing this is that we are unable 
to identify a potential father for the child, and therefore cannot obtain a correct measure 
of household income for these groups. This sampling implies that women without 
children in our sample are all married, but that couples with children in common need 
not be married. Because most Swedish first-born children are born out of wedlock, this 
necessity to exclude unmarried childless women is somewhat unfortunate. The 
estimates obtained for childless women may not reflect the effects of changes in child 
                                                 
11 See Table A.1 for some descriptive statistics. http://www.skolverket.se/sb/d/1663 for statistics. 
12 IFAU collected child care fee data via an email-request sent to all Swedish municipalities asking for 
exact formulas on how they calculated prices in 2001–04. Information about the exact fee structure from 
220 of Sweden's 290 municipalities was received. Comparing the pre-reform child care costs for a 
number of type families in the municipalities that responded with those of the municipalities that did not 
respond (available in Skolverket, 1999) we conclude that they are very similar, which implies that we 
need not worry about a selection of a specific type of municipality. 
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care fees in the whole population of childless women, since married couples are likely 
to differ from unmarried couples in several respects. It is, however, not clear if they 
should be expected to be more or less sensitive to changes in child care fees compared 
to unmarried couples. 
For the households in our sample, we obtain register-based information on the 
woman’s age, education, country of origin, annual income for the woman and her 
partner, as well as the number of children living in the household and their respective 
ages. We also obtain register information on whether the woman has given birth to a 
child in the pre-reform and post-reform periods. 
 
3.3 Defining pre- and post-reform periods 
 
We assume that the fertility decisions of households were first affected by the reform 
when they knew that it would be implemented in their municipality.13 As mentioned in 
Section 2.2, municipalities did not decide until the late fall of 2001 whether or not to 
implement the child care reform. Taking the nine months gestation period into account, 
July 2002 is when we can expect the first births in response to reduced costs. Allowing 
for some randomness in conception and delayed responses, we define a post-reform 
sample consisting of all women meeting our sample criteria in 2001, and register their 
births during an 18 month time window after the reform (i.e. July 2002–December 
2003). 
Our data allows us to construct two pre-reform samples as comparisons for the 
post-reform sample. The first pre-reform sample consists of women meeting the 
sampling criteria in 1997, and their births in the period July 1998 through December 
1999. The second pre-reform sample consists of women meeting the sampling criteria in 
1999 and measures births in July 2000 through December 2001. Children conceived 
earlier than March 2001 are hence assumed to be unaffected by the reform, while 
children conceived between October 2001 and March 2003 are potentially affected by 
the reform.  
 
 
                                                 
13 This assumption will be tested in the empirical analysis. 
 
13
3.4 Computing child care costs and birth rates 
 
Since child care charges depend on a number of observable household characteristics, 
we can compute the households’ remaining child care costs, assuming that the 
household’s children plus an additional child are enrolled in full-time care until each 
child reaches the age of ten.14 Column (1) of Table 1 presents the present value of the 
remaining child care costs for the pre- and post-reform samples. When computing pre-
reform costs, we apply the pre-reform fee schedules collected in the survey15. Post-
reform costs are computed using the reform fee schedule as it was stipulated by central 
government, thus assuming that the capped fees were implemented in the same way 
across the country. As is clear from the table, comparing the pre-reform and post- 
reform sample of households, the costs of child care decreased dramatically due to the 
reform. On average, the net present value of remaining child care costs decreased by 
106,000 or more than 50 percent, from SEK 194,980 to SEK 89,220. The drop in the 
standard deviation of child care costs also shows that the variation in fees across 
households decreased radically when the reformed national fee schedule replaced local 
fee schedules.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Note that we do not observe whether children are actually attending child care, and if so, for how many 
hours. The cost-measure we calculate is based on the assumption that everyone attends child care and 
after-school care full time. When totaling child care costs over time, we have further assumed that the 
families discount future costs exponentially with the discount rate 0.03. Within reasonable limits, results 
are not sensitive to the choice of discount factor.  
15 The information collected by IFAU pertains to the fee schedules as they were in 2001. Information on 
prices scheduled prior to 2001 is not available, but the survey information suggests that there were no 
major changes in local fee schedules in the years prior to the reform. As a result, we use the fee schedule 
for 2001 to compute what the household pre-reform fee was in the years prior to 2001. Although inflation 
was minor during these years, we have, however, denominated household incomes in 2001 prices using a 
consumer price index, in order to achieve comparability across years. 
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Table 1 Pre-reform and post-reform remaining child care costs in SEK 000s and the number of 
child births per 1,000 women (during an 18 month spell). 
 Sample 
Year 
Child Care Cost Births 
    
1997 187.75 
(69.32) 
81.40 
(273.45) 
 
Pre-reform 
1999 194.98 
(70.79) 
85.13 
(279.08) 
    
Post-reform 2001 89.22 
(31.00) 
95.19 
(293.48) 
Note: Average values. Standard deviations in parenthesis 
 
Ignoring twin births and very closely spaced siblings, we count one birth if the woman 
bears at least one child during the defined 18-month period, and zero otherwise. The last 
column in Table 1 reports the average number of births per 1,000 women during an 18 
month time window before and after the reform for the households sampled. A 
comparison of the number of births for the 1997, 1999 and 2001 samples shows an 
increase over time, with a sharper increase after the reform.16 
The capping of child care charges implied that the largest cost cuts accrued to 
households that initially had high costs. In order to get a better understanding of which 
type of households experienced the largest cost reductions, Table 2 shows changes in 
remaining child care costs at different parity and levels of household income. Note that 
the largest cost changes accrued to well- off families that already had two children, 
while low income households without children received a much smaller reduction in 
child care cost. Although the within- family type variation in child care cost changes 
was smaller for families with low incomes or few children, Table 2 also illustrates that 
the reform also introduced substantial variations in costs for households with similar 
incomes and the same number of children. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Table A3a-c contains child care costs and birthrates for all sub groups of households that are analyzed 
later on in this paper.  
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Table 2 Change in present value of remaining child care cost 1999–2001 for a household giving 
birth to one additional child, SEK 
Parity Household income, quantiles 
 Low medium high 
    
No children -57.84 -88.64 -108.52 
 (20.10) (23.77) (33.52) 
    
One child -82.95 -115.07 -130.28 
 (33.41) (34.81) (41.84) 
    
Two children -89.85 -125.11 -146.45 
 (37.34) (40.30) (50.89) 
    
Three or more children -92.34 -129.97 -143.53 
 (38.69) (41.33) (54.03) 
Note: Average values. Standard deviations in parenthesis 
 
3.5 Defining household types 
 
The estimation strategy discussed in section 3.1 relies on comparisons of households 
that are identical with respect to all factors affecting both child care fees and fertility, 
but that experience different changes in child care costs because they live in different 
municipalities. To achieve such a comparison, we need to a) define household types 
based on income, the number of children and the age of the children, and b) observe 
each household type in at least two municipalities, both before and after the reform. In 
defining household types we therefore face a trade-off. The more narrowly we define 
household types, the more precise is our measure of child care costs, the smaller the 
within-household type variance in characteristics that determine child care charges and, 
hence, the more truly random is the within-household type variation in child care costs. 
The drawback of too narrowly defined household types is that we are less likely find 
matches over time for the same household type in at least two municipalities. Hence, the 
more precise our household types, the less representative is the sample used for 
estimation. This problem is fruitfully illustrated by household income. Household 
income is a continuous variable, and it is therefore not possible to perform an 
unconstrained match. Doing so would prevent us from finding matches for most of our 
household types. Instead, we use monthly income spans of SEK 1,000 in 2002 prices. 
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When matching the exact age of each child, a similar problem arises. Instead, we choose 
to define household types by their number of children under the age of 10, the exact age 
of the youngest child and the age category of each of the next three youngest children, 
and the household’s monthly income span. We only consider the four youngest children 
in the household, since only a few municipalities before the reform, and none after, 
charged beyond the fourth child. The age categories are defined in line with the typical 
age categories determining child care charges, 1–3, 4–5 and 6–9. 
The success rate of the chosen matching strategy is presented in Table 3. The 
number of municipality-household types (Zjm) for 1997 and 1999 is 393,670. Of these, 
56 percent or 110,712 (221424/2) municipality-household types are present in both 
years and are hence included in the estimations. Note that the municipality-household 
types that are dropped, for lack of comparable households in a specific municipality in 
the next period, are rare municipality-household types in the sense that they represent 
few households. As a result, the fraction of households included in the estimations is 78 
percent, which is much larger than the fraction of municipality-household types that are 
included. Turning to the years 1999 and 2001, we see that the fraction of municipality-
household types that find a matching household type is similar to the previous period, 
55 percent, accounting for 77 percent of all households. 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics on the matching 
 1997 & 1999 1999 & 2001 
 No. of  obs. 
in total 
sample 
No. of obs. 
in matched 
sample 
Percent 
matched 
sample of 
total 
No. of  obs. 
in total 
sample 
No. of obs. 
in matched 
sample 
Percent 
matched 
sample of 
total 
Municipality-
household type 
 
393,670 
 
221,424 
 
56% 
 
402,336 
 
222,696 
 
55% 
Households 1,035,835 810,497 78% 1,031,356 797,789 77% 
 
3.6 Graphical analysis 
 
Before turning to the econometric estimations, we present a graphical analysis to 
provide an initial indication of whether reduced child care costs affected birth rates. In 
Figure 3 we plot the birth rate per 1,000 women in 1997, 1999 and 2001 for three 
categories of household types that came to experience large, medium or small 
reductions in child care charges. We can see that there is a positive trend in fertility 
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rates for all three categories of household types already before the reform. Between the  
1999 and 2001 samples, the increase in the number of births, however, appears to be 
greatest for households that received the largest reductions in costs, and the smallest for 
the households that encountered the least changes.  
 
Figure 3 Births per 1,000 women by magnitude of cost reductions 
 
 
 
To further illustrate the different effects for the three categories, we present the 
detrended changes in birth rates between 1999 and 2001 in Figure 4.17 It is clear from 
the Figure that the detrended increase in birth rates between 1999 and 2001 is larger for 
households that received larger cost reductions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 We have extrapolated the fertility trend between the 1997 and 1999 sample. 
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Figure 4 Detrended change in births per 1,000 women by magnitude of cost reductions. 
 
 
4 Results: Effects of child care costs on fertility 
 
The graphical analysis in the previous Section indicated a positive relationship between 
reduced child care costs and increased fertility. In order to determine if there is, in fact, 
a causal effect of child care costs on birth rates, we turn to a formal analysis of the data, 
as outlined in Section 3.1.  
 
4.1 Baseline estimates 
 
Table 4 reports the baseline estimates obtained when reductions in child care costs are 
regressed on changes in fertility. In column (1) we present the estimates of the model 
given by equation (1) in Section 3. The coefficient for child care costs is -0.03, which 
implies that a SEK 1,000 reduction in child care costs increases the number of births by 
0.03 children per 1,000 women.18  
 
 
                                                 
18 Due restrictions in computational capacity, we estimate the model in first differences, as mentioned 
above. Estimating on first differences entails a cost in terms of efficiency. If we instead estimate the 
model in column (1) using the within- estimator, the point estimate remains the same, but the standard 
deviation decreases considerably, and the effect is now significant at the 1-percent level. 
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Table 4 Child care costs and fertility  
 Child births per 1,000 women, 1997–2001 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Child care cost -0.031* -0.048*** -0.040** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) 
Age  -11.242*** -11.224*** 
  (0.162) (0.165) 
University  33.492*** 33.656*** 
  (1.417) (1.440) 
    
Municipal×household type FE Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal trend   Yes 
Household type trend   Yes 
    
Observations (household types) 222,060 222,060 222,060 
R-squared 0.00 0.03 0.05 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * indicates significant at the 10%-level, ** at the 5% and *** at the 1% 
level. Household types are defined by number of children under the age of 10, exact age of youngest child, age 
category (ages 0–3, 4–5, 6–9) of next three youngest children and household monthly income span of 1,000 SEK. 
 
 
In column 2, we introduce controls for the average age of women and proportion of 
women with a university degree in each municipality × household-type cell. This causes 
the estimated coefficient for child care costs to increase somewhat in magnitude to 
0.048. Since child care fee schedules do not depend on maternal age or education, one 
possible explanation of the change in the point estimate is that the responses to cost 
changes differ across women depending on their age and education. Closer examination 
reveals that the coefficient for child care costs is sensitive to including a control for age, 
but not to controlling for education.19 We further explore the presence of heterogeneous 
effects by age in Section 4.3. 
In column 3 we investigate whether the estimates are robust to taking differential 
time trends at the municipal level and household type level into account. The coefficient 
for child care costs diminishes slightly, but is still negative and significant. Thus, we 
can conclude that lowering the costs of child care does indeed have a positive impact on 
fertility. The estimated effect, ranging between -0.03 and -0.048, implies that the 
average reduction in child care costs, which amounted to some SEK 106,000, increased 
                                                 
19 These results are available on request. 
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the number of child births per 1,000 women during an 18-month period by 3–5 children. 
Compared to the average of 85 children born to 1,000 women in an 18-month period 
prior to the reform, this implies that the birth rate increased by 4–6 percent, and that the 
child care reform accounted for about 30–50 per cent of the increase in fertility that took 
place during this period.  
 
4.2 Placebo results 
 
As a further robustness check, we examine whether the reform was exogenous to 
fertility behavior prior to the reform. This includes testing whether households 
anticipated the reform and reacted early, or if household types that experienced large 
reductions in child care costs already had an increasing trend in fertility before the 
reform. We test the exogeneity of the reform by performing a placebo test in which we 
predate the reform to 1999 and attempt to explain changes in fertility behavior of 
household types between the 1997 and 1999 samples in terms of changes in the child 
care charges that these household types did not experience until after the period studied. 
To this end, we compute each household’s costs in 1999, using the post-reform fee 
schedule, and compare the fertility behavior of the 1997 and 1999 samples. 
Our identification strategy depends on the assumption that the reform-induced 
child care costs would have no effects on changes in fertility behavior between these 
years. Significant estimates would indicate that the analysis suffers from identification 
problems, generating spurious correlations between child care cost reductions caused by 
the reform and the fertility behavior of households. Table 5 shows that the changes in 
child care charges introduced in 2002 cannot explain behavior in 1999. The coefficients 
for child care cost are small and not statistically significant in either specification.20 The 
effects of the woman’s age and education are, however, stable for both the “true” and 
the placebo specifications.  
 
                                                 
20 The lack of statistical significance is not an effect of low efficiency of the first-difference-estimator. 
Estimating the model in column (1) using the within-estimator also produces statistical insignificant 
estimates. 
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Table 5 Placebo-test 
 Child births per 1,000 women, 1997–99 
 (1) (2) 
   
Child care cost 0.009 0.025 
 (0.015) (0.030) 
Age  -11.051*** 
  (0.231) 
University  31.951*** 
  (2.014) 
   
   
Municipal-Household type FE Yes Yes 
Municipal trend  Yes 
Household type trend  Yes 
   
Observations (household types) 110,712 110,712 
R-squared 0.00 0.07 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * indicates significant at the  
10%-level, ** at the 5% and *** at the 1% level. Household types are 
defined as in Table 5.  
 
In sum, there seems like the reduction in child care charges increased fertility. The lack 
of significant results in the placebo regressions strengthens the interpretation that the 
effect is causal. In the following Sections, we will investigate the presence of 
heterogeneous responses to child care costs. 
 
4.3 Women’s age 
 
The instability of the baseline estimates in Table 4 to inclusion of the average age of the 
women in the household type × municipal cell suggested a presence of heterogeneous 
responses to the child care cost changes by women of different ages. In this Section we 
explore this possibility further. 
When estimating heterogeneous effects, we need to re-define our household types, 
also taking the age of the woman into account.21 The median age in our sample of 
women is 34. We have therefore categorized women as old or young if they are older or 
                                                 
21 Since the number of children is already taken into account when defining household types, 
investigating heterogeneous effects for couples with and without children does not mean that we need to 
re-define the household types. 
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younger that the median age. Defining these different age categories implies splitting 
many household × municipal cells in two, which causes us to lose out on some 
households for which we no longer find matches.22  However, we still find matches for 
almost 70 percent of the households.  Average child care costs and birth rates before and 
after the reform for young and old women are presented in Table A3a in the Appendix. 
Table 6 displays the results of the analysis on a sample matched at the age × 
household type × municipal level. The results show that it is only the young women 
who respond to the changes in child care costs. The coefficient for older women is close 
to zero. For women aged 34 or younger, a cost increase with 1,000 SEK leads to 
approximately 0.05 fewer births per 1,000 women.  
 
Table 6 Heterogeneous effects with respect to women’s age  
Child births per 1,000 women 
 (1) (2) 
   
Child care cost    
 Young women (<35) -0.041* -0.049** 
  (0.024) (0.024) 
 Older women (>35) 0.005 -0.001 
  (0.021) (0.021) 
   
Municipal-household type FE Yes Yes 
Household characteristics  Yes 
Municipal trend Yes Yes 
Household type trend Yes Yes 
   
Observations (household types) 227,161 227,161 
R-squared 0.02 0.02 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * indicates significant 
at the  10%-level, ** at the 5% and *** at the 1% level. 
Household types are defined by number of children under the age 
of 10, exact age  of youngest child, age category (ages 0–3, 4–5, 
6–9) of next three youngest children, household monthly income 
span of 1,000 SEK and women older or younger than 35.  
Household characteristics include average age of women and 
fraction of women with a university degree in each household type 
× municipal cell. 
 
 
                                                 
22 This is the reason to why we restrict the number of age categories to two. 
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4.4 Women’s labor supply 
 
Swedish parents with small children have the right by law to shorten their work hours 
down to 75 percent of full-time. A large fraction of mothers exercises this right. A 
closer look at the work hours of the women in our sample shows that women with more 
children are more likely to work part-time. This tendency to work part-time may 
indicate that the Swedish child care system, which provides subsidized child care during 
regular work-hours, makes it difficult to combine children with long work-hours. In this 
section we investigate whether the response to child care charges depends on the initial 
labor supply of the woman in the household. 
In columns (1) and (2) in Table 7 we have not taken into consideration the finding 
that households reacted differently to changes in child care costs depending on the age 
of the woman in the household, but only investigated whether the effect is 
heterogeneous with respect to the woman’s labor supply. We find that it is only women 
who work part time (i.e. less than 80 percent of full time) who react to changes in child 
care costs. In columns (3) and (4) we let the effects vary both with respect to age and 
labor supply and find that it is only for part-time working women younger than 35 that 
the effect is statistically significant. Although the coefficients for all interactions are 
negative the standard errors are relatively noisy. An increase in child care costs with 
1,000 SEK leads to a decrease in child births with 0.185 children per 1,000 women. 
These figures should be compared to the average number of births per 1000 women 
prior to the reform for subgroup of women that was below 35 years old and worked part 
time which was 139 (see Table A3c in the Appendix). Hence the average childcare 
reduction which for this group was 110,000 SEK implies an increase in the birth rate of 
almost 15 percent. 
One interpretation of this finding is that Swedish child care, which is supplied 
during regular work hours, is not flexible enough for full time working women to 
respond to reductions in child care charges with increased fertility. For these women, 
having another child is likely to require them to reduce work hours when they return to 
work after a year’s parental leave. The loss in earnings associated with having another 
child is therefore larger than for women who are already working part time. An 
alternative explanation to the heterogeneous response with respect to work-time may be 
that women working part-time are more likely to have small children and that women 
with small children were more likely to react to the change in child-care charges. 
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Perhaps, women working full time, do so precisely because their children are older and 
because they do not plan to have more children. However, the correlation between 
work-time and age of the youngest child is only 0.03. Moreover, results from 
estimations that are not presented here, show that the age of the youngest child does not 
influence the response to the reform.23 
 
Table 7 Heterogeneous effects with respect to women’s labor supply and age 
Child births per 1,000 women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Child care cost     
   Part time  -0.061 -0.068   
  (0.051) (0.049)   
   Full time  -0.014 -0.024   
  (0.051) (0.049)   
   Part time Young women (<35)   -0.183** -0.185** 
    (0.080) (0.080) 
   Part time Older women (>35)   -0.048 -0.045 
    (0.050) (0.050) 
   Full time Young women (<35)   -0.027 -0.032 
    (0.068) (0.067) 
   Full time Older women (>35)   -0.043 -0.044 
    (0.048) (0.047) 
     
Municipal-household type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household characteristics  Yes  Yes 
Municipal trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household type trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations (household types) 129,066 129,066 117,602 117,602 
R-squared 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.07 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * indicates significant at the  10%-level, ** at the 5%  
and *** at the 1% level. In column 1 and 2 household types are based on the same characteristics  
as in Table 4. In column 3 and 4 household types are based on the same characteristics as in Table 
6. Household characteristics include average age of women and fraction of women with a 
university degree in each household type × municipal cell 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 . These results are available upon request. 
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4.5 The number of children 
 
Finally, we investigate whether the effects differ depending on how many children the 
households initially have. This analysis can give us a hint as to whether the effects on 
birth rates that we have found so far are the result of anticipation of children already 
planned, or whether the completed fertility of the women affected by the reform is 
likely to have increased.  
Table 8 displays the results of estimating our model when we have included 
interaction terms for child care costs with dummy variables that capture parity. We start 
by investigating whether the effects differ for couples with or without children. We do 
so by including an interaction term for child care costs, with a dummy variable 
indicating that the household has no children24. The result in the first column shows an 
effect both for households with children and for childless couples, although the response 
of the latter group is larger. In the second column, we study whether the effect differs 
depending on the woman’s age. In line with previous results, it is the younger women 
who have children in response to the reductions in child care charges, and this is true 
both for households with and without children. A 100,000 SEK decrease in child care 
charges increased fertility with three percent for families with children and 5.5 percent 
for families without children. 
                                                 
24 The fixed effect of being a household with no children is included in the household-type fixed effect 
since the number of children is one of the variables defining the household type. 
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Table 8 Heterogeneous effects with respect to family size and age – childless 
couples and families with children in daycare-age 
  Child births per 1,000 women 1997–2001 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  All households Household with children in 
daycare-age 
All women Women with 
children 
-0.041** 
(0.019) 
   
 Childless 
couples 
-0.111** 
(0.053) 
   
Young women 
(<35) 
Women with 
children 
 -0.047* 
(0.024) 
  
 Childless 
couples 
 -0.180** 
(0.073) 
  
Old women 
(>35) 
Women with 
children 
 -0.008 
(0.021) 
  
 Childless 
couples 
 -0.079 
(0.051) 
  
One child   -0.003 
(0.034) 
 
Two children   -0.044* 
(0.026) 
 
All women 
Three or more 
children 
  0.079 
(0.049) 
 
One child    -0.026 
(0.043) 
Two children    -0.053* 
(0.029) 
Young women 
(<35) 
Three or more 
children 
   0.039 
(0.063) 
One child    0.019 
(0.032) 
Two children    -0.028 
(0.026) 
Old women 
(>35) 
Three or more 
children 
   0.136** 
(0.055) 
      
Municipal×household type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household type trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations (household types) 222,060  227,161 188,159 188,159 
R-squared 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * indicate significant on the 10%-level, ** on the 5% and ** 
on the 1% level. Household characteristics include average age and fraction of women with a university 
degree in the household type × municipal  × age cell. 
 
Next, we turn to study the possible differential effects depending on parity. We estimate 
a separate effect of child care fees on families with one, two and three or more children. 
The results in the third column show that families with one child do not respond. The 
point estimate of -0.003 is insignificantly different from zero. Also, for higher order 
parities –  families with three or more children –  is there no response to the change in 
child care charges. The results show that it is families with two children that respond 
positively to cost reductions. 
27
Since our previous investigations suggest different responses depending on the 
mother’s age, we interact the dummies capturing parity with dummies indicating 
whether the mother is younger or older than the median age (34). In line with previous 
results, the results in the last column show that it is younger mothers with two children 
who respond to the cost reductions. Actually, this group seems to be the type of family 
for which the reform induced the largest response. A 100,000 SEK decrease in child 
care charges increased fertility rates with 7,4 percent. 
We have no clear-cut explanation as to why older mothers of three or more 
children react by having fewer children when costs decline. It should be noted, however, 
that families with 4 or more children are very rare in Sweden, especially families 
satisfying the restriction that all children have to be of an age eligible for subsidized 
child care, i.e. 1–10 years old. In our sample, the average probability of having another 
child for households with three children and a mother categorized as old is only around 
25 children per 1,000 women during an 18 month period. As a result, a few births may 
have substantial effects on our outcome variable. 
Are the effects on birth rates that we have found so far the result of anticipation of 
children already planned, or can we expect the completed fertility of the women 
affected by the reform to have increased? A thorough analysis of this issue would 
require data on completed fertility rates. Since these will not be available for many 
years to come, we are restricted to alternative ways of exploring this issue.  
One approach to differentiating effects on timing from long-run fertility that is 
commonly employed by demographers (see e.g. Hoem, 1993) is to study third or higher 
order births. If the number of higher order births increases, while there is no reduction 
in first or second births, the net effect is likely to be an increase in long-run fertility. 
Also, since historically most families in Sweden choose to have two children, increases 
in third births should be more informative about long-term increases in fertility. Our 
results hence suggest that there is indeed a possibility that long-run fertility was 
positively affected by the reform.25  
 
 
 
                                                 
25 In this analysis, we focus on families with children of child care age. 
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5 Conclusions 
 
We have explored the effect of introducing a cap on child care charges on the fertility 
behavior of Swedish families. Exploiting the exogenous changes in child care costs 
introduced by the Swedish child care reform of 2001, we can conclude that child care 
charges have an effect on fertility. In particular, we find that fertility over an 18-month 
period increased by about five per cent when total child care cost for the average family 
was reduced by SEK 106,000 (USD 17,800), or that a USD 10,000 reduction in child 
care costs would have led to 2–3 more child births per thousand women. This implies 
that the reform can account for as much as half of the total post-reform increase in 
fertility.  
We find that it is young women working part-time who account for most of the 
effect of child care charge reductions on fertility in the Swedish context. Moreover, 
Lundin et al. (2008) show that labor supply was not affected by the change in child care 
costs. These results contrast with recent findings on U.S. data.  Cortes and Tessada 
(2008) have found that increased immigration reduced the cost of child care services, 
which, in turn, increased the share of professional mothers with small children who 
worked very long hours.  Furtado and Hock (2008) also find a positive effect on the 
fertility of highly educated women. A possible explanation for the different results is 
that while the Swedish child care cost change concerned costs for care during regular 
work hours, the US cost change concerned also more flexible nanny services.  The high 
incidence of part time work for Swedish mothers and the rather short child care hours of 
Swedish children suggest that, while it is straightforward to be a working mother, it is 
hard to combine a full time career with motherhood. One interpretation of the absence 
of an effect of child care charge reductions on the fertility on full time working women 
is that for these women the income forgone during a year’s parental leave and possibly a 
reduction in hours when returning to work may be too high in relation to the child care 
cost change induced by the reform. 
One key question is whether the Swedish child care reform led to increased 
completed fertility rates, or whether the reduction in the child care charges only 
influenced the spacing between child births. We argue that there is some evidence that 
long-run fertility rates were affected. The strongest argument in favor of this conclusion 
is that the reform increased the number of third births without negative effects on first 
and second births.  
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Is the magnitude of the effects we find reasonable? We can compare the 
magnitude of the estimated effect with the findings of other studies that investigate the 
effect of other economic incentives on fertility. Milligan (2002) investigates the effects 
of a pro-natalist transfer policy implemented in Quebec, by which mothers received a 
cash bonus for giving birth. Using the exogenous variation created by the reform, he 
finds that there is a substantial impact of child care allowances on fertility rates.26 
Milligan finds that a cash bonus of 1,000 Canadian Dollars (USD 950) increased 
fertility by 16 percent. Laroque and Salanié (2004), instead, apply a structural model of 
maternal labor supply and fertility to French data and family policies (although ignoring 
the effects of child care). In simulations, they find that increasing mothers’ earnings 
reduces fertility, but that increasing child support during the first three years, 
corresponding to a present value cash transfer in of some USD 20,000 would increase 
fertility by a quarter.  
The effects found in this study are comparatively small. Hence, although we find 
that child care costs do affect fertility, general child care subsidies appear to be an 
expensive way of stimulating overall fertility, at least when compared to the 
international evidence on other types of policies presented here. However, we need to 
bear in mind that the Swedish child care reform managed to increase fertility without 
any negative effects on female labor supply (Lundin et al., 2008). Whereas cash 
transfers or other policy instruments are likely to increase fertility at the cost of lower 
female labor supply, low child care charges may be an efficient way of combining high 
labor supply with high fertility rates. 
                                                 
26 Kearney (2004), on the other hand, finds no negative effects from a decrease in cash allowances beyond 
a certain number of births on fertility among welfare-prone groups in the US in 1989–98. On the contrary, 
for some groups, she finds an increased number of births. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 Descriptive statistics of child care quality 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Costs per enrolled child, 
SEK 
 
83,000 
 
 
86,900 
 
 
90,200 
 
 
93,700 
 
 
95,900 
 
 
96,600 
 
Number of enrolled 
children per worker 
 
5.3 
 
5.4 
 
5.3 
 
5.3 
 
5.4 
 
5.4 
Share of personnel with 
higher education 
 
54 % 
 
54 % 
 
52 % 
 
51 % 
 
51 % 
 
51% 
Source: http://www.skolverket.se/sb/d/1663 
 
 
Table A.2 Variable definitions 
Child: Dummy that takes the value 1 if the household had a child in an 18-month period 
Child care cost : The present value of the total child care costs associated with having the family’s existing children 
plus an additional child enrolled in full-time child care until the age of 10. 
Age:  Age of the women in the households minus the median age (34) 
University: Dummy that takes the value 1 if the woman in the household has some university education 
The data is collapsed at the household-municipal level, and therefore one observation will be the household type × 
municipality  average×year 
age 35+: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the woman in the household is 35 or older. 
Childless couple: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the household has no children 
One child: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the household has one child 
Two children: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the household has two children 
Three or more children: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the household has three or more children. 
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Table A.3a Pre-reform and post-reform total remaining child care costs in SEK 000s 
and the number of child births per 1,000 women (during an 18 month spell).  
  Sample 
Year 
Child Care Cost Births 
Young Pre-reform 1999 205.02 
(73.16) 
176.09 
(273.72) 
 Post-reform 2001 97.25 
(33.71) 
199.71 
(287.56) 
Old Pre-reform 1999 187.91 
(68.13) 
21.09 
(112.40) 
 Post-reform 2001 83.86 
(28.54) 
25.52 
(123.34) 
Childless     
 Pre-reform 1999 147.45 
(46.02) 
199.74 
(248.59) 
 Post-reform 2001 62.42 
(16.33) 
226.13 
(261.11) 
Families with 
children 
Pre-reform 1999 198.92 
(71.01) 
75.65 
(203.88) 
 Post-reform 2001 91.43 
(30.88) 
84.35 
(215.41) 
1 child Pre-reform 1999 192.93 
(63.93) 
148.52 
(262.03) 
 Post-reform 2001 87.51 
(25.54) 
159.49 
(270.73) 
2 children Pre-reform 1999 222.16 
(73.19) 
49.85 
(167.70) 
 Post-reform 2001 106.18 
(30.35) 
55.62 
(179.00) 
More than 2 children Pre-reform 1999 229.01 
(81.83) 
49.92 
(206.48) 
 Post-reform 2001 114.09 
(34.73) 
55.47 
(220.12) 
Part-time Pre-reform 1999 196.23 
(69.62) 
65.19 
(210.36) 
 Post-reform 2001 89.53 
(29.54) 
74.06 
(223.85) 
Full-time Pre-reform 1999 204.37 
(66.65) 
80.37 
(215.63) 
 Post-reform 2001 91.55 
(28.04) 
88.38 
(225.08) 
     
Note: Average values. Standard deviations in parenthesis 
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Table A.3b Pre-reform and post-reform total remaining child care costs in SEK 000s 
and the number of child births per 1,000 women (during an 18 month spell).  
Households with women 34 and younger  
  Sample 
Year 
Child Care Cost Births 
All Pre-reform 1999 205.02 
(73.16) 
176.09 
(273.72) 
 Post-reform 2001 97.25 
(33.71) 
199.71 
(287.56) 
Childless Pre-reform 1999 145.73 
(44.99) 
326.87 
(251.74) 
 Post-reform 2001 62.29 
(16.55) 
346.14 
(257.63) 
     
families with 
children 
 
Pre-reform 
1999 211.92 
(72.69) 
158.55 
(270.76) 
 Post-reform 2001 101.74 
(31.55) 
180.91 
(285.80) 
     
     
1 child Pre-reform 1999 199.41 
(67.14) 
301.77 
(304.81) 
 Post-reform 2001 93.46 
(28.00) 
317.30 
(308.78) 
     
2 children  Pre-reform 1999 221.10 
(73.62) 
71.60 
(194.06) 
 Post-reform 2001 108.37 
(31.57) 
82.13 
(210.66) 
More than 2 children  Pre-reform 1999 219.87 
(78.41) 
65.88 
(233.81) 
 Post-reform 2001 110.81 
(34.31) 
76.56 
(254.53) 
     
Part-time  Pre-reform 1999 208.94 
(71.37) 
139.14 
(328.80) 
 Post-reform 2001 99.23 
(31.11) 
156.71 
(346.54) 
     
Full-time  Pre-reform 1999 224.63 
(73.91) 
170.156 
(351.14) 
 Post-reform 2001 104.18 
(30.98) 
190.40 
(366.53) 
     
Note: Average values. Standard deviations in parenthesis 
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Table A.3c Pre-reform and post-reform total remaining child care costs in SEK 000s 
and the number of child births per 1,000 women (during an 18 month spell).  
Households with women 35 and older  
  Sample 
Year 
Child Care Cost Births 
All Pre-reform 1999 187.91 
(68.13) 
21.09 
(112.40) 
 Post-reform 2001 83.86 
(28.54) 
25.52 
(123.34) 
Childless  
Pre-reform 
1999 149.66 
(47.23) 
35.65 
(109.46) 
 Post-reform 2001 62.86 
(15.99) 
49.69 
(136.09) 
Families with 
children 
Pre-reform 1999 190.22 
(68.50) 
20.20 
(112.51) 
 Post-reform 2001 85.00 
(28.63) 
24.20 
(122.47) 
1 child Pre-reform 1999 188.05 
(60.94) 
33.12 
(139.27) 
 Post-reform 2001 83.00 
(22.48) 
40.12 
(153.28) 
2 children Pre-reform 1999 223.46 
(72.63) 
23.27 
(123.20) 
 Post-reform 2001 103.84 
(28.79) 
27.34 
(131.55) 
More than 2 children   Pre-reform 1999 240.02 
(84.48) 
30.68 
(165.68) 
 Post-reform 2001 117.61 
(34.83) 
32.85 
(173.01) 
Part-time Pre-reform 1999 197.23 
(72.22) 
19.81 
(133.72) 
 Post-reform 2001 88.26 
(29.39) 
22.58 
(142.80) 
Full-time Pre-reform 1999 209.55 
(72.20) 
24.01 
(143.74) 
 Post-reform 2001 92.43 
(28.37) 
29.99 
(160.71) 
Note: Average values. Standard deviations in parenthesis 
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